PRC History in Crisis and Clover by Jeremy Brown
 1 
positions 28.4 November 2021 
Brown | PRC History in Crisis and Clover 
PRC History in Crisis and Clover  
Jeremy Brown 
Abstract 
The history of the People’s Republic of China is now an established discipline, with a built-in 
theoretical framework—aspirational socialism—and a first draft written by social scientists. The 
growth of the field of PRC history has been aided by an avalanched of unique grassroots sources. 
Grassroots documents, many of which are local archives discarded by the state, have prompted 
new research questions and uncovered hidden dimensions of the Mao years, but they remain 
inaccessible to the broader research community unless scholars go out of their way to digitize 
and share them. This solution, however, reveals a deeper crisis facing the field: even though new 
types of sources will continue to fuel the growth of PRC history, scholars farthest away from Xi 
Jinping’s organs of repression can share sources and write about them freely, while academics 
subject to authoritarian restrictions cannot. There is no easy fix to the two-tier system created by 
Document Nine’s prohibition against evidence-based history research. Nonetheless, collaborative 
translation projects and vigorously pushing for a more diverse and inclusive field in and outside 
of China can help PRC history continue to flourish. 
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In an introduction to a special issue of China Quarterly on the history of the PRC published in 
2006, political scientist Julia Strauss (2006: 855) observed that “now is an enormously vibrant 
time for the study of the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in its phase of active 
revolution between 1949 and 1976.” Strauss ended her essay with a call to action: “We are still 
very much in search of PRC history, and hope that others will pick up where this volume 
concludes” (869). In the years since 2006, PRC history has gradually acquired all the trappings 
of a formally recognized field of academic inquiry. These include a journal (the PRC History 
Review), an H-Net channel called H-PRC, a book series from Cambridge University Press, 
panels and a reception at the Association for Asian Studies annual meeting, as well as turf 
battles. 
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One promising sign of the healthy development of PRC history has been lively arguments 
about scholars’ theoretical frameworks, research questions, and how to find and use sources. 
Which theories should underpin the field? To what extent should historians build on or engage 
with the work of social scientists who have written about China since 1949, especially when it 
comes to forming research questions? Is it better to start with theories and questions, or to start 
with sources? How can we maximize the strengths and overcome the shortcomings of grassroots 
sources? I weigh in on these field-defining arguments in the first part of this article. 
Vigorous scholarly debates are a sign that PRC history is in good shape, but storm clouds 
have accompanied the field’s growth. PRC history is simultaneously flourishing and in crisis. 
During the year after Xi Jinping became China’s top leader in 2013—the same twelve-month 
period when scholars outside of China launched the PRC History Group and the Cambridge book 
series—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cracked down on critical, evidence-based research 
about its own history and tightened access to archival sources. All scholarship is political. In the 
Xi Jinping era, however, researching PRC history has not only been an overt political 
intervention but also has become scary and dangerous. Understanding China’s recent past is 
more important than ever in today’s high-stakes environment of arbitrary detentions, censorship, 
internment camps, and pandemic politics. The final sections of this article argue that in response 
to genuine dangers that have increased since Xi Jinping took office, scholarship on China since 
1949 has adapted in creative ways and will continue to flourish. A more pressing crisis for the 
field is addressing how the real dangers of Xi’s dictatorship are exacerbating existing inequities, 
and finding ways for scholars in and outside of China to work toward a more inclusive field that 
recognizes and reflects the diversity of historians and the people they study. 
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PRC History Comes with Its Own Framework: Aspirational Socialism 
In 2016 I asked the H-PRC discussion forum to help identify the most important and influential 
theoretical work in the field of PRC history. Fifteen scholars answered. Many mentioned 
excellent books about China that discuss or deploy theory, but that was not what I was asking 
for—I was wondering if there was a single theoretical work or body of work, maybe even one 
that did not mention China, that had most strongly influenced our field. Michael Schoenhals 
responded, “Whether we are its friends or members or opponents really does not matter: the fact 
is that it is the Chinese Communist Party that has provided us with most of the seemingly 
indispensable awls, edgers, and tweezers that make up the theoretical toolkits we carry along 
when approaching PRC history in our professional capacities. . . . An intentionally provocative 
alternative answer to Jeremy’s question could therefore also be the Selected Works of Mao 
Zedong!” Kristin Stapleton added that the first thing that came to her mind was Marxism-
Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought (“Most Important/Influential” 2016). 
Schoenhals and Stapleton are correct that PRC history already comes along with the 
ready-made framework of Marxism-Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought. Hundreds of millions of 
people in China learned about and applied Maoism after 1949. Mao’s interpretation of Marxism, 
Leninism, and Stalinism provided a road map for socialist modernization at the national policy 
level. It also shaped the educational curriculum, news coverage, patriotic rituals, the layout of 
standardized bureaucratic forms, and many other aspects of daily life in cities and villages. But 
in practice, Maoism was not a fixed itinerary. It shifted over time, lurching toward extremes and 
then overcorrecting, causing profound harm to millions and disappointment for many more. How 
can historians make sense of this juxtaposition between utopianism and dashed dreams? 
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In my research about risk, safety, and accidents after 1949, I have highlighted the 
Chinese Communist revolution’s central promise of a safe and healthy modern society where 
people could go to work without being exploited and without being killed in an accident. The 
CCP’s socialist modernization project took this promise seriously, but it fell far short of 
delivering on it (Brown forthcoming). When I made this point in a talk in 2017, historian Karl 
Gerth pointed at his midsection and said that he really wants six-pack abs and he has lots of self-
help books about how to achieve perfect stomach muscles, but his desire and his bookshelf are 
not enough to justify calling him “Six-Pack Karl.” He meant that even though China’s goal 
during the Mao years was to achieve socialism, the gap between aspiration and reality was so 
large that it would be as ludicrous to call China socialist as it would to refer to Karl Gerth as Six-
Pack Karl.1 
Gerth is correct that “socialist China” is an inaccurate label for what sociologist Andrew 
Walder (1987) has referred to as “actually existing Maoism.” Utopian aspirations and messy 
reality, however, can and should be studied simultaneously. Whether people in China studied 
socialist ideals because of their “intrinsic insight or value,” or whether, as Walder (1987: 157) 
suggests, people paid attention to Mao’s thought “because they had no choice,” the ideals 
themselves were important during the Mao years and they remain relevant today. We can 
distinguish between Gerth’s ideals—as seen on his bookshelf—versus the reality of his torso, 
and thereby gain a more complete understanding of him as an individual. Historians learn a lot 
by noticing such clues as a Bowflex machine in the corner or a Mao statue on the table. But 
historians should not stop there. It is also worthwhile to try to understand someone’s motivation 
for wanting to sculpt his abdomen—does he see intrinsic value in rock-hard abs, or does he feel 
like he has no choice? Figuring out why someone buys The Six-Pack Secret or prominently 
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displays a Mao portrait helps to understand the social context that shapes individual, family, and 
community choices. If historians of the People’s Republic accept that the hukou system, class 
status labels, the Great Leap famine, and the Cultural Revolution significantly affected hundreds 
of millions of individual lives, then the starting point for PRC history projects should be an 
awareness of the aspirational framework that gave rise to these systems and events—Mao 
Zedong’s road map to socialism, as conveyed in the Little Red Book, People’s Daily, and the 
Stalinist Short Course history of the Bolshevik Party.2 
Andrew Walder’s “Actually Existing Maoism,” published in 1987, reads like the product 
of a moment when many scholars who had previously sympathized with the stated goals of the 
Chinese Communist revolution suffered from embarrassed disillusionment with Maoist ideals.3 
Walder (1987: 156) writes that Maoism as a populist, egalitarian ideal was a myth, a 
“rationalised, heavily edited reconstruction by Western scholars, for Western consumption, 
designed to appeal to Western sensibilities.” Focusing excessively on happy ideals, Walder 
argues, excludes other important aspects of Maoism, including a “paranoid political world view 
that sees Chinese society as riddled with hidden conspirators and traitors” and a “mentality that 
encourages the treatment of ‘enemies’ as nonhumans subjectable to any form of humiliation and 
torture” (158). Walder’s myth-versus-reality formulation may have been a useful corrective at 
the time, but it presented a false dichotomy. Myth and reality were intertwined in Mao’s 
collected works as well as in Chinese society. Anyone who has read Mao’s “On the People’s 
Democratic Dictatorship” can see how populism, egalitarianism, paranoia, and the 
dehumanization of enemies coexisted in a single short document. Readers of Roderick 
MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals’s Mao’s Last Revolution (2006) can find abundant 
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evidence of how these phenomena intermingled in the everyday lives of Chinese people between 
1966 and 1976. 
If socialism was attempted but fell short in China, as Gerth’s girth metaphor reminds us, 
and if mythical Maoism was different from the traumas of actually existing Maoism, as Walder 
noted decades ago, why should PRC historians bother mentioning socialism and Maoism? First, 
as Covell Meyskens argues in his article in this issue, many people in China proudly considered 
themselves socialists during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; they found genuine inspiration in the 
ideas of Marx, Lenin, and Mao. To deny these identity claims is to misrepresent the lived 
experience of millions. Whether people memorized Mao quotations eagerly or did so under 
duress, their shared experience created a canon that bridged regional, ethnic, and generational 
divides (Leese 2011). The creation of this shared canon was part of the “real increase in social 
homogeneity” that Jake Werner highlights in his article in this issue. 
Second, lofty socialist ideals created an existential crisis for the socialist project. The 
field of happiness studies claims that “HAPPINESS equals REALITY minus EXPECTATIONS” 
(Baucells and Sarin 2012: 49).4 Promises about the coming of socialism in China set 
expectations so impossibly high that even though life expectancy, education, and health 
improved during the Mao years, reality fell so far short of utopia that many people were 
unhappy. Philosopher Ci Jiwei identified this crisis well before anyone claimed credit for 
inventing a happiness equation. Ci (1994: 5) {{Insert missing space after colon}}calls the 
promise of socialist construction under Mao “sublimated hedonism.” Ci writes, “had it not been 
for the high hopes” promised by Maoist utopianism, “the Chinese people would not have 
sacrificed so much and demanded so little.” What happiness researchers would call unhappiness, 
Ci describes as “nihilism”; the Chinese term bu manyi 不滿意 may capture the idea better than 
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any English phrase. In Ci’s words: “At the point they expected the future to meet the present . . . 
nothing happened. The gap between future and present . . . which had been the locus of an 
energizing tension as long as people anticipated that the gap would one day be closed, became, 
once that anticipation evaporated through disappointment and loss of stamina, the very site of 
nihilism.” This transition from anticipation to nihilism was palpable for some people—Chan, 
Madsen, and Unger ([1984] 2009: 231) identify Lin Biao’s death in 1971 as a moment when 
questions and doubts replaced activism and hope for sent-down youth in Chen Village. “We lost 
faith in the system,” said one sent-down youth. Another recalled, “It all seemed so hypocritical. 
The craze of studying Mao’s work was over.” 
Exploring the relationship between expectations and reality has sparked path-breaking 
PRC history research. For example, Yiching Wu (2014) has shown how activist youth on the 
intellectual margins critiqued the Cultural Revolution for failing to meet socialist standards. For 
such thinkers as Yang Xiguang, far from being too leftist, Maoism in the 1960s and 1970s was 
not socialist enough. In fact, it is difficult to find a work of PRC history that does not in some 
way benefit from Ci Jiwei’s version of the happiness equation. Even Andrew Walder, who had 
no use for mythical Maoism in the 1980s, comes full circle in China under Mao: A Revolution 
Derailed (2015). While Walder gives more explanatory weight to Party organization and Soviet-
style political economy than to the unfulfilled promises of aspirational socialism, his book’s 
subtitle drives home his message: the revolution must have started on track, but it went off the 
rails. Whatever scholars of PRC history think about socialism, practicing historical empathy 
means taking seriously how people in China defined, thought about, supported, or felt 
disappointed by socialism during the decades we are studying. 
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PRC History Is Not a New Field: Social Scientists Wrote the First Draft 
Social scientists exploring China’s recent past during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were doing 
historical work. In fact, they founded the field of PRC history. PRC history is as old as the PRC: 
C. K. Yang ([1959] 1965) was doing rural fieldwork between 1948 and 1951; A. Doak Barnett 
(1963, 1964) saw the People’s Liberation Army enter Beiping in 1949; Robert Lifton (1961) 
interviewed people about thought reform in 1954. In the four decades after 1949, long before 
historians started doing PRC history, several generations of social scientists working in area 
studies, political science, and sociology departments had already examined how the Communist 
Party was attempting to reshape China (Schurmann [1966] 1968), provincial and elite politics 
(Vogel 1969; MacFarquhar 1974; Teiwes 1979), communication (Liu 1971), land reform (Shue 
1980), political movements (Lieberthal 1980), class stratification (Lee 1978; Rosen 1982), urban 
life (Whyte and Parish 1984), factory politics (Walder 1986), and many other facets of the Mao 
years. 
After China moved on from the Mao period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, social 
scientists also moved on to study the changes of the reform era, leaving behind only a small 
handful of historically minded scholars who eventually became outliers in their own disciplines, 
most notably political scientists Neil Diamant and Elizabeth J. Perry and sociologists Joel 
Andreas and Andrew Walder. When, in the 2000s, a significant number of historians started 
writing about China’s 1950s as history, the few social scientists still actively researching the 
Mao years were understandably miffed by historians’ failure to cite their work and disregard for 
their research questions. Neil Diamant emailed me after reading City versus Countryside in 
Mao’s China (2012), praising the book but noting that I had failed to cite or show how I was 
building on relevant political science literature about China’s cellular political economy (Shue 
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1988), cadre corruption (Lü 2000), marriage, and veterans (Diamant 2000, 2009). Diamant was 
right to point out these shortcomings. 
Diamant elaborates on his critique of PRC history’s blindness toward earlier generations 
of scholarship in a review of Revolution, Resistance, and Reform in Village China, coauthored 
by political scientist Edward Friedman, historian Paul Pickowicz, and sociologist Mark Selden 
(2005). The book is the sequel to Chinese Village, Socialist State (1989). In his review Diamant 
(2008: 622) praises the 2005 book’s coverage of rural politics but complains that the three 
authors disregard “most social science conventions” and “do not engage any theories, the 
secondary literature on rural reform, or the comparative literature on village politics.” 
Chinese Village, Socialist State may be the first work of PRC history that counts a trained 
historian among its authors. Chinese Village, Socialist State mentions more secondary literature 
than Revolution, Resistance, and Reform does, but its theoretical engagement remains hidden. 
Rather than elaborating on how it relates to theory, it gives readers its framework in the title: a 
local “Chinese” culture full of family complications and kinship networks clashed with a 
flattening socialist modernization project. This model resonates with earlier political science 
(Lieberthal 1980) and sociological (Schurmann [1966] 1968) works exploring the relationship 
between Chinese tradition and modernity during the 1950s. Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden, 
however, do not belabor how their book builds on earlier work about China or how it relates to 
Weberian models of tradition and modernity. The authors choose to let readers make these 
connections for themselves. Theory is present, but it is embedded obliquely in the narrative. 
Hiding theory and minimizing citations of secondary literature is an explicit choice. It frustrates 
such critics as Diamant, but the authors must figure that they gain more than they lose by making 
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such a choice. Scholars can see the implicit framework for themselves, while undergraduates and 
general readers can enjoy the accessible narrative. 
Diamant does have a good point: PRC historians would benefit from reading and citing 
social scientists. Historians writing about China’s 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s do not, however, 
have to accept social scientists’ frameworks and questions as their own. In 2016, political 
scientist Elizabeth Perry (2016: 116) lamented that “many” historians of the PRC, “especially 
among the younger generation in the West,” choose to “grub for diversity in the dustbins of 
grassroots society” instead of answering the “key questions that attracted but eluded an earlier 
generation of social scientists.” Perry argues, “Fulfilling the promise of PRC history calls for 
rising above ‘garbology’ to engage seriously with the big questions posed, but necessarily left 
unanswered, by a previous generation of social scientists.” Michael Schoenhals (2016) disagreed, 
writing, “The agenda of questions that attracted social scientists to the professional study of 
China a generation or two ago is already itself history, so let us please refrain from urging 
today’s graduate students and assistant professors to ‘revisit’ it as if it were something else!” 
New sources and new questions can allow historians to respect the contributions of older 
scholarship while explaining change over time in fresh ways that overturn timeworn or even 
erroneous assumptions. At the heart of this issue is the word questions. Perry is a pioneer in the 
study of the history of the People’s Republic who has asked and answered many significant 
questions about governance in China (Perry 1994, 2005, 2012; Perry and Li 1997). Working out 
puzzles by looking at documents in the Shanghai Municipal Archive or other officially produced 
and curated sources, however, yields different results than answering questions based on such 
garbological materials as public security dossiers or Red Guard publications. Schoenhals has 
shown that rare grassroots sources can offer original answers to questions that have long 
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interested social scientists. Inspired by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks’s (1984: 1) 
statement that the “great danger of any missing historical dimension is that its absence may 
distort our understanding of other, accessible dimensions,” Schoenhals (2013) has uncovered 
previously hidden dimensions of life in China in the 1950s and 1960s. He has asked how the 
presence of secret agents manipulated by public security officials affected the identification and 
punishment of purported counterrevolutionaries. Schoenhals (2015) has also asked how mass 
organizations’ independently published newsletters in 1966 and 1967 call into question mistaken 
assumptions about the Cultural Revolution and freedom of speech in Chinese history. Grassroots 
sources provide new evidence about what actually happened in China during the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s that challenges inaccurate narratives and reveals the shortcomings of officially 
compiled or vetted sources. 
Grassroots Sources: Opportunities and a Problem 
I refrained from putting “what actually happened” inside quotation marks in the previous 
sentence because accidents, conversations, events, fights, massacres, meetings, sexual affairs, 
trends, and other phenomena actually did occur in China between 1949 and the present. Different 
types of sources offer different ways of looking at what actually happened. If the Tianjin 
Municipal Archive had given me access to every document I wanted to see in 2004, I would have 
stayed inside its friendly and comfortable confines, playing table tennis with the staff during 
lunch break. But all I was allowed to see were fairly bland reports—the entire Cultural 
Revolution decade was off limits and personal stories and human color were few and far 
between. Frustration with limited access to the official archive drove me to a booming gray 
market that included such unofficial sources as diaries and letters but also state-created material 
that local representatives of the Party-state decided to discard but did not destroy (Schoenhals 
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2004; Brown 2010, 2019; Leese 2019). Historian Eric Hobsbawm (1985: 65–66) has lamented 
that scholars interested in European “history from below” initially struggled because “there 
simply is not a ready-made body of material about” grassroots history: 
In most cases the grassroots historian finds only what he is looking for, not what is 
already waiting for him. Most sources for grassroots history have only been recognized as 
sources because someone has asked a question and then prospected desperately around 
for some way—any way—of answering it. We cannot be positivists, believing that the 
questions and the answers arise naturally out of the study of the material. There is 
generally no material until our questions have revealed it. 
Hobsbawm’s statement is an imperfect fit for China, where grassroots material has been ready 
and waiting for desperate prospectors, whether they arrive with a puzzle in mind or whether they 
wait for questions and answers to emerge from the sources. 
Hundreds of thousands of ready-made bodies of grassroots material are stored in local 
Chinese archives. Some historians have been fortunate enough to gain access to these sources. 
Others have been shut out of official archives and have been driven to flea markets and 
bookstores, where sackfuls of grassroots sources appeared in the 1990s and 2000s.5 Scholars 
who already have a question in mind can find rich answers in grassroots sources. Neil Diamant 
(2000: 12), for example, asked what impact the marriage law of 1950 had on Chinese families. 
Investigation reports about marriage and divorce held at district and county archives offered 
many unexpected answers: “administrative bumbling” gave women “space to change their 
status,” and the “open sexual culture” of rural areas “facilitated the sort of change envisioned” by 
the marriage law. 
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Diamant proceeded as Hobsbawm recommended: start with a question and look for 
answers in the sources. But scholars who do the opposite—those who, in Perry’s words, “grub 
for diversity” in a “janitorial role” and allow new questions to emerge from their empirical 
findings—are advancing PRC history as well. Sinologist Michael Schoenhals (2014) has argued 
that fifty pages of missing persons notices (xunren tongbao 尋人通報) could be the starting point 
for an alternative narrative of China’s 1960s and 1970s, a history of “lives that need not 
necessarily have been uneventful, but had somehow managed not to have everything about them 
determined by Mao Zedong’s grand design.” I fruitfully ignored Hobsbawm’s advice when I 
read a dossier about a police officer accused of sexual assault. I originally bought the file 
because I had a question in mind about how people experienced the rural-urban divide at the 
grassroots. At the flea market I decided to get it because it focused on someone who had been 
deported from Tianjin to the countryside. Then I put it aside, used other deportation files to argue 
that ejecting political enemies from the city was an official program managed and funded by 
municipal authorities rather than an example of Red Guard–led “chaos,” and forgot about it for 
several years. By the time I picked it up, I was no longer working on the gap between city and 
countryside. I read it because it was in a box waiting for me, not because I was looking for 
something specific. 
The puzzles that emerged from the file hinged on how criminal justice functioned at the 
grassroots during the 1960s and 1970s. Memoirs and scholarly works commonly portray the 
Cultural Revolution as a lawless period characterized by false and unjust accusations. What if 
some accusations lodged during the Cultural Revolution were not exaggerated or fabricated, but 
instead revealed actual crimes? What legal avenues could victims and convicted criminals 
pursue? How did a shifting political climate affect how security officials investigated appeals? 
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The answers touch on police work, sexual violence, transitional justice, and stereotypes about the 
Cultural Revolution (Brown 2018). A Party-state that controls access to material about the recent 
past while allowing discarded dossiers to circulate in flea markets has unintentionally facilitated 
a variety of useful approaches—some scholars have put questions first and sources second, 
others have started with sources and allowed questions to arise during the reading process. 
Original conclusions can emerge from either strategy. 
One big problem with PRC history’s unique source environment can be found in the 
footnotes, the point of which is to allow readers to assess the reliability of the writer’s 
conclusions. This problem affects citations of sources held in official archives as well as material 
found in flea markets. Say I want to verify Diamant’s (2000: 144, 375) claims about Yunnanese 
women neglecting class struggle and instead criticizing their in-laws and husbands. Diamant has 
helpfully provided the file and page numbers of documents held at the Chuxiong Prefectural 
Archive, where he enjoyed unfettered access in the 1990s. I have three ways to assess Diamant’s 
interpretation of these sources: I could travel to the archive with file numbers in hand, I could ask 
a local research assistant to do the same, or I could email Diamant and ask him to dig through his 
photocopies and share the passage in question. Options one and two are expensive and might 
meet with official rejection—just because Diamant saw a source in the 1990s does not mean that 
archivists will let anyone see it in 2020. Option three is better, but it depends on the longevity of 
Diamant’s storage and filing system as well as his generosity, which I know is expansive. 
Garbage material discarded by the state that is now circulating in society presents an even 
better fourth option—sharing digitized documents—that represents a big step toward 
accessibility and transparency. I heard that a graduate student counted all of the sources cited in 
Maoism at the Grassroots (2015) and complained that far too many documents were held in 
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personal collections inaccessible to readers. This critique is valid. Sixty-four of the eighty-nine 
footnotes in the book’s “Adrift in Tianjin” chapter refer to a single diary to which only Sha 
Qingqing and I have access. This story about adolescent anxiety in 1976 would be more 
convincing if other scholars could assess our use of the source. To make this possible, I am 
following in the footsteps of other digitization projects6 to make sources I have previously cited 
from my own collection available to other researchers through the PRC History Source 
Transparency Project.7 Abandoned refuse rescued by peddlers, collectors, and historians can and 
should be stored and—whenever possible—shared so that as many people as possible can learn 
from their rich contents. Digital humanities tools can allow footnotes that include the phrase 
“author’s collection” to be an open door rather than a dead end. 
PRC History Is in Crisis, PRC History Is Flourishing 
In an H-PRC discussion thread about sources cited by Frank Dikötter in Mao’s Great Famine 
(2010), Sergey Radchenko defended online sharing of sources held in official archives (a 
category distinct from discarded refuse) on three grounds: “documents that are in the state 
archives are deemed to be in the public domain . . . posting select documents or portions thereof 
does not amount to copyright infringement . . . public interest may vastly outweigh any archival 
prerogative.” A Chinese researcher responded that intellectual property law was not the crucial 
issue for Chinese scholars. Because the “Chinese government linked archive with natural 
security,” he wrote, uploading sources, even English-language translations of them, “will 
probably slide people into big trouble. That’s why most of Chinese scholars keep silence” 
(“Looking” 2015). {{AU: Is the highlighted wording true to the source? If this is a 
translation, can it be changed to “That’s why most Chinese scholars keep (or stay or 
remain) silent”?}} {{Original is in English, so we can’t change it}} 
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PRC history is not only the history of an authoritarian past but also a political 
intervention in an authoritarian present. This reality has created a two-tier system: scholars 
farther removed from the actually existing coercive organs of the People’s Democratic 
Dictatorship (specifically, the Ministry of State Security and the Bureau to Guard Domestic 
Security, also known as the “First Department” of the Ministry of Public Security)8 can make 
reasonable arguments about copyright, while those whose livelihoods and families are inside 
China legitimately fear big trouble. This divide goes deeper than how and whether scholars 
collect and share sources. Simply conducting research on and writing about recent Chinese 
history in a critical, evidence-based fashion is unacceptable by the standards of Party Center’s 
Communique on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere of 2013 (commonly known as 
Document Nine). 
Document Nine (“Document 9” 2013) identifies “promoting historical nihilism, trying to 
undermine the history of the CCP and of New China” as an approach that “is tantamount to 
denying the legitimacy of the CCP’s long-term political dominance.” Academic historians’ job 
description is to explain change over time, not to bolster or undermine any particular political 
organization. Historians devoted to explaining change over time are doing a proper job if they 
uncover and interpret evidence that “denies the historical inevitability in China’s choice of the 
socialist road” or that “rejects the accepted conclusions on historical events and figures.” I spent 
years in graduate school learning how to deny historical inevitability and reject accepted 
conclusions. For Party Center, however, these are unacceptable expressions of historical 
nihilism. Document Nine considers ordinary historical research politically antagonistic, justifies 
closing archives and reclassifying previously accessible documents, sparks the active removal of 
individual historical articles from scholarly databases (Tiffert 2019), closes off publication 
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venues, limits funding opportunities, and quashes graduate training. It makes doing PRC history 
an overtly political act in the here and now. 
Scholars who have the privilege of holding secure academic positions outside of China 
can proudly violate the admonitions of Document Nine, take strong stands in favor of critical 
academic inquiry, and stress about whether they might encounter problems obtaining a visa, a 
difficulty that 5 percent of more than five hundred China scholars reported experiencing 
(Greitens and Truex 2020). Foreign scholars who do enter China can still visit archives and 
libraries, do oral history interviews, and buy books from vendors, but, as two recent cases have 
shown, even these innocuous acts can lead to uncomfortable interrogations or even extended 
detention. In 2017 in Shanghai, security agents questioned Dayton Lekner, who was working on 
a PhD dissertation about literary circulation during the Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist 
campaigns. {{Apologies for typing over the editor’s fix to the previous sentence—referring to 
2019 was confusing in my original submission and remained confusing after the editor added 
“was to” defend. Less is more here, it’s better to keep the focus on what Lekner was doing in 
2017}} The officers knew that Lekner had been interviewing elderly intellectuals about their 
experiences during the late 1950s. After a three-hour interrogation in a police station, the officers 
made Lekner promise to not release information from his interviews and to keep the 
interrogation secret—a pledge he proudly violated after leaving China (Lim 2017). Lekner’s 
experience was stressful but brief. Nobu Itawani, a historian at Hokkaido University, had a 
longer nightmare. Itawani was detained in September 2019, apparently because he had purchased 
material about Kuomintang history from a used bookstore. After Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
intervened, Itawani was released in November 2019, but not before he was forced to confess to 
“collecting inappropriate historical materials” (O’Dwyer 2019). 
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Historians cannot do their job properly without violating Document Nine, which can lead 
to unpleasant and dangerous consequences, as the experiences of Lekner and Itawani show. 
Restrictions on access to documents and fear of being detained seem like a crisis for PRC history 
research, especially compared with the pre-2013 openness of archives, conferences, flea markets, 
and publishing. But the crisis is not a permanent condition, nor is it all-pervasive. In 2018, 2019, 
and even in 2020 and 2021, as pandemic lockdowns eased in Chinese cities, I received positive 
reports from at least seven researchers who successfully viewed useful and interesting documents 
at no fewer than eight county and municipal archives throughout China. Many of those 
researchers also smoothly conducted oral history interviews without noticing any attention from 
security agents. In August 2019 I attended a workshop on PRC history at a mainland Chinese 
university. Professors and graduate students from Chinese institutions presented papers that 
included such topics as officially-mandated quotas for executing counterrevolutionaries during 
the early 1950s, extreme starvation and violence in a single commune during the Great Leap 
Famine, and students assaulting their teachers during the Cultural Revolution. These edgy pieces 
will not be published inside China until the political situation relaxes, but workshop participants 
energetically debated and critiqued their arguments and use of evidence; the authors took note of 
the feedback they received and will wait for a more opportune political moment to share 
improved versions of the research. 
The workshop was a welcome reminder of the extent to which post-1949 history 
flourished inside China during the 2000s and early 2010s. During those relatively open years a 
large group of Chinese experts on post-1949 history actively developed the field of guoshi 国史 
(PRC history), a subject of inquiry that is pointedly separate from dangshi 党史 (Party history). 
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Literally “history of the state”—meaning the new country that was born in 1949—guoshi sounds 
like a bland descriptor, but the term has subversive potential because it decenters the Communist 
Party from the study of recent Chinese history and argues for the historical validity of stories, 
narratives, moments, and people who operated beyond, below, around, or even in opposition to 
the Party. Some of the most active guoshi scholars work in universities (Cao 2005, 2015; Y. Li 
2016; Y. Liu 2016a, 2016b; Ruan 2009; Shen 2003, 2008; Tang 2003; H. Wang 2021; K. Yang 
2009, 2016; J. Zhang 2015; S. Zhang 2010). Some work in official research institutes (Chen 
2003). Some are journalists (Tan 2010; J. Yang 2008, 2016), some are independent scholars who 
compile primary sources (D. Wang 2007) and publish such underground journals as Bashan 
yeyu, Jiyi, Wangshi, and Zuotian.9 Some publish under pseudonyms (Shi 2012). 
Many of the scholars at the August 2019 workshop in China expressed frustration at the 
increasing difficulties they face in researching and publishing on PRC history compared with the 
golden era of guoshi of the late 2000s and early 2010s. But the older professors had seen far 
worse, including the inside of jail cells during the 1970s and bullets flying and blood flowing in 
the streets of Beijing on June 3 and June 4, 1989. When viewed in comparison with previous 
moments of repression, the crisis facing PRC history today seems dire but not fatal. This is 
especially true because a multiplicity of research methods and source repositories in and outside 
of China are continuing to allow the field to flourish. In response to difficulties in getting access 
to municipal and provincial archives—and also in response to the narrow, state-centered scope of 
the contents of documents held in these buildings—many Chinese universities have established 
their own archives of PRC history material, including cadre work journals, diaries, family letters, 
and village- and county-level dossiers. {{note that my proposed change in the previous sentence 
overrode the editor’s fix; I did not mean limitations on sources, I meant that the nature of the 
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sources themselves was limited. My new language is meant to clarify}} Selections from these 
gold mines have begun to be published outside of China (Zhang and Yan 2018; Zhang, Xi, and 
Yan 2018). 
During the past two years nervous administrators and intrusive security agents have 
restricted access to or even shut down these collections. But this temporary shuttering may 
actually be conducive to long-term preservation: the documents are out of sight, out of mind, and 
ready to be revived in the future. In the meantime, researchers at the August 2019 workshop 
reported no restrictions on their ability to continue carrying out oral history interviews about 
PRC history. If doors should slam shut on doing oral history in China, other doors outside of 
China remain open, including the possibility of field work among recent immigrants in such 
communities as Vancouver as well as such valuable resources as the Michael Schoenhals 
Collection of Cultural Revolution materials held at Lund University and collections of grassroots 
sources stored at Stanford University’s East Asian Library and Hoover Institution Archives. 
Even memoir articles written online on such blog platforms as Sina and Sohu have become 
revelatory sources for PRC history, as shown by Karl Gerth’s most recent book—Gerth wisely 
used the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine to preserve blog posts before censors removed 
them (Gerth 2020). In other words, restrictions on conventional archival sources in China have 
given rise to creative and diverse research methods and have pushed researchers to unearth 
sources and talk to people that they might have otherwise neglected if they had been researching 
in a less authoritarian context. This creativity cannot help but lead to fresh topics and novel 
conclusions. Adaptation in response to the crisis caused by Document Nine has led to innovation. 
This ensures that the field of PRC history will continue to be in clover. 
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Making More Space for Diversity and Inclusion in PRC History 
The open critical discussions and creative adaptability on display at the workshop in China in 
August 2019 were encouraging and energizing. But the event was not perfect. The audience 
seated outside of the inner table of presenters reflected the sex ratio of Chinese society—slightly 
more men than women, but almost even. Of the twenty-six papers presented, however, there 
were six female authors and twenty male authors. The leadership roles at the workshop were 
more skewed, more akin to the Communist Party’s all-male Politburo Standing Committee. Of 
the workshop’s sixteen discussants, fifteen were men and one was a woman. Zero of the eight 
panel chairs were women. Zero of the eight roundtable speakers who closed the workshop were 
women. During the roundtable I said that I hoped that at future workshops the inner table would 
look more like the audience sitting outside of it. I stopped there because I had personally 
contributed to the imbalance as a presenter, discussant, chair, and roundtable speaker, and also 
because practitioners of PRC history based outside of China have lots of work to do on diversity 
and inclusion issues—the maleness and whiteness of this special issue is only one small example 
of a broader problem that the field needs to address. 
Chinese society is Han supremacist, sexist, ableist, heteronormative, and cisnormative. 
Where I live and work in North America is a white supremacist, sexist, ableist, heteronormative, 
and cisnormative society. These structures of power and oppression privilege mainstream voices 
and limit opportunities for marginalized groups. The field of PRC history is not immune to these 
structures. This observation may seem facile, but it still needs to be pointed out and openly 
acknowledged at conferences, editorial board meetings, seminars, and workshops—and in “state 
of the field” special issues like this one. The backgrounds and identities of scholars who work on 
PRC history may not directly determine the topics they choose, the questions they ask, the 
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research methods they use, and the theoretical frameworks they employ. But background and 
identity do matter, as do unspoken social norms and assumptions that benefit privileged groups 
and harm marginalized ones. When conference organizers, editorial boards, and graduate 
mentors accept the status quo rather than actively identifying and pushing back against structures 
of oppression, they not only continue to harm marginalized groups and individuals but also cause 
suboptimal scholarly outcomes, because shutting out diverse topics, questions, methods, and 
frameworks means that hidden dimensions of PRC history will remain hidden. 
There is no quick fix to this problem, but by recognizing it and taking it into account 
when organizing panels and workshops, recruiting graduate school applicants, and issuing calls 
for manuscripts, all scholars—especially graduate mentors and publishing gatekeepers—can 
push the field in more diverse and inclusive directions.10 Repression in China under Xi Jinping, 
however, has created a crisis that is more difficult to address. None of the twenty-six papers 
presented at the workshop I attended in China in August 2019 focused on frontier regions, non-
Han groups, or religious topics, let alone queer history. When I pointed out this silence during 
the closing roundtable, the organizers responded that these themes were truly too sensitive to be 
touched on at an academic workshop inside China; they said that they hoped that in the future the 
political situation would relax and allow coverage of today’s no-go zones. This answer was 
heartfelt. Just look at the track record of such senior guoshi researchers as Wang Haiguang and 
Yang Kuisong, who have written empathetically and perceptively about ethnoreligious rebellion 
and queer history, respectively (H. Wang 2015; K. Yang 2015). 
The deeper crisis facing the field of PRC history, therefore, goes beyond archival 
restrictions. It is an inclusivity crisis. Outside of China scholars can and must push for a field that 
is more inclusive of scholars and research topics that reflect the diversity of the places we study 
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and the places where we work and live. This is a difficult, complex, long-term project, but it is 
achievable. Inside China, however, pushing for inclusivity and advocating for minority rights are 
illegal. Xi Jinping’s policies exacerbate existing inequities, most notably by targeting and 
incarcerating Muslims in a massive forced assimilation project. As long as this coercive 
secularization and sinification project continues, critical historians working inside China know 
that the Great Leap famine and students beating up their teachers in 1966 are safer topics than 
frontier regions, non-Han peoples, or religion. The ongoing cultural genocide in Xinjiang, along 
with the repression of such marginalized voices as Marxist students at Peking University, 
#MeToo activists, and survivors of the Beijing massacre, among others, contributes to a gap 
between PRC historians in and outside of China. The many researchers inside China who 
actively want to advocate for diversity and inclusion—both in their scholarship and within their 
scholarly circles—find it difficult, if not impossible, to do so safely. This unevenness is unfair. It 
is a crisis for the field of PRC history. 
How can scholars address this crisis? There are as many possible answers are there are 
scholars working on PRC history. My own answers are not meant to be prescriptions for others 
to follow. My own first step is to continue documenting and explaining historical change in a 
diverse society where people sometimes resisted or ignored state repression and violence. I 
happily accept Jake Werner’s label of empiricism and his accurate and perceptive observation in 
his article in this issue that my scholarly agenda “vindicates the rights of civil society.” Werner is 
also correct that the brand of empiricism found in my monograph and coedited volumes does not 
piece together events and experiences at random. It actively seeks to highlight individuals, 
families, communities, and narratives that have been harmed or marginalized by state repression 
or by scholarly blinders. This is why focusing on farmers, gay and straight factory workers, 
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midwives, rural teachers, and women weavers was an explicitly political choice in Dilemmas of 
Victory (2007) and Maoism at the Grassroots (2015), as was the inclusion of chapters about 
Guizhou, Tibet, and Xinjiang. None of my books have come close to including every 
marginalized voice that has been silenced, nor did they achieve my goal of mentioning an 
individual person’s name on at least every other page.11 Those shortcomings can be improved on 
in future projects. 
Step two is to continue to collaborate with scholars in China on translation projects, 
increasing Chinese readership of English-language scholarship and increasing Anglophone 
exposure to Chinese-language scholarship. The Chinese-language edition of Dilemmas of Victory 
(2011) and chapters by Cao Shuji, Wang Haiguang, Wu Zhe, and Yang Kuisong in Maoism at 
the Grassroots (2015) are small bricks in a bridge that aims to address unevenness and 
unfairness in PRC history by encouraging people living, studying, and working in different 
political environments to listen to one another. Other, more impressive bricks include the 
Reading the China Dream collaborative translation project run by David Ownby, Timothy 
Cheek, and Joshua Fogel, plus Geremie Barmé’s prolific translations in China Heritage. 
Chinese-to-English and English-to-Chinese language inclusion is not only an inside 
China/outside China problem but also a global problem. China-born scholars who are studying 
and working outside of China can be disadvantaged by implicit bias when admissions and hiring 
committees, conference organizers, and editorial boards see a name rendered in pinyin or—even 
in a double-blind refereeing situation—notice signs that an author’s first language is not English. 
This then contributes to an institutional diversity problem, as the high-quality work of China-
born and English as an Additional Language (EAL) scholars does not always get the recognition 
it deserves when it comes to graduate admissions, hiring, and publishing, leading to being 
 25 
overrepresented in for-profit publication venues, smaller or lesser known graduate programs, and 
teaching-heavy jobs. Letting nature take its course is not going to fix this problem, so I see step 
three toward inclusion as actively pushing back against implicit bias and valuing institutional 
diversity. Starting editorial reviews, graduate admissions, and hiring with this principle in mind 
can gradually improve the situation. A more immediate move toward institutional inclusivity 
would be to keep doors and gates wide open to ensure that PRC history cooperates with existing 
scholarly groups rather than siloing itself off as a special subfield. To what extent has the 
excitement of setting up a new book series, journal, and online presence blinded energetic 
proponents of PRC history—myself included—to the excellent work of organizations and 
scholars who focus on China since 1949 but might not always highlight the term “PRC history”? 
Chinese Historians in the United States (CHUS) and its journal Chinese Historical Review, as 
well as the Historical Society for Twentieth-Century China (HSTCC) and its journal Twentieth-
Century China, have long histories of inclusive field-building that can be learned from and 
joined. 
Step four is to recognize that an inclusive approach that values diversity means practicing 
humility and respecting diverse viewpoints. This is what I mean when I caution against viewing 
my points as prescriptive. Instead of telling others to be like me, to adopt my agenda, to prioritize 
the grassroots sources I love or the questions I think are important, I would urge the opposite. 
For example, Jake Werner’s approach in his piece in this issue differs from my own but is valid 
and important. As Werner notes, scholars need to recognize and explain how some people have 
benefited from state-mandated homogenization and experienced it as liberatory. To neglect or 
downplay this phenomenon hampers a comprehensive understanding of China’s 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s. It also closes off the possibility of productive conversations with the millions of 
 26 
people in China today—themselves beneficiaries of homogenization—who accept Xi Jinping’s 
defense of the need for “Vocational Education and Training Centers” in Xinjiang or who use 
WeChat to blithely engage in anti-Muslim bigotry and call for armed crackdowns against Hong 
Kong protesters. To refuse to try to understand and talk to those who voice these identity claims 
is as misguided as ignoring aspirational socialism. 
My scholarly agenda is the product of a historical moment that celebrates civil society 
and that valorizes resistance against oppression. My status as a voice to listen to in the field of 
PRC history is the product of a historical process that has normalized white, male, straight, cis, 
ableist privilege. Is this so obvious that it should go without saying? Yes. Even so, does it still 
need to be said? {{Please revert this change and keep my original “Does it still need to be said?” 
without the Even so. I prefer fewer words here.}} Yes. Repeatedly stating the obvious is the only 
way to dismantle a status quo that needs to get blown up. When I step back and recognize that 
voices like mine have been too loud for too long, I can make more room for voices that have 
been marginalized and silenced in and outside of China. This is one way to fight for inclusivity 
in PRC history and to allow the field to flourish even more than it already has in the years since 
Julia Strauss assessed the state of the field. Strauss’s own search for PRC history led her to a 
comparative study of state formation in China and Taiwan during the 1950s (2020). Strauss’s 
fresh approach has the potential to push the field in new directions by reminding scholars that 
including Taiwan in discussions of PRC history can shed light on the PRC’s uniqueness while 
sparking imaginative and hopeful visions of alternatives and paths not taken. Taiwan, for 
example, shows that stepping back and making room for marginalized voices does not threaten 
prosperity and stability. It can do the opposite. This applies to fields of scholarly inquiry and to 
authoritarian dictatorships. Just look at the path of Taiwan after Chiang Ching-kuo, the heir to a 
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violent homogenizing project parallel to the one that Xi Jinping is still pushing, stepped back and 
made room for voices that had been repressed for decades. 
Notes 
I respectfully acknowledge that this article was written on the unceded traditional territories of 
the Tsleil-Waututh, Kwikwetlem, Squamish, and Musqueam Nations. I am grateful to Fabio 
Lanza and Aminda Smith for their encouragement and patience. I thank Sigrid Schmalzer, 
Angela Xiao Wu, and three anonymous reviewers for their critical feedback on an earlier draft of 
this article. The inspiration for this article’s title comes from the title of a seminar taught by 
Mark Halperin at Lewis & Clark College in 1999 about late imperial China “in crisis and 
clover.” 
1 Gerth (2020) elaborates on this point and presents a competing label—a form of state 
capitalism called “state consumerism.” 
2 On the impact of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short 
Course in China, see H.-Y. Li 2006, 2010. 
3 For more on this moment, see Lanza 2017. 
4 Some web pages claim that Tom Magliozzi of NPR’s Car Talk may have uttered this phrase 
before Baucells and Sarin published it in a book. Google executive Mo Gawdat (2017: 26) 
published a more convoluted version of the formula (happiness is greater than or equal to “your 
perception of the events of your life” minus “your expectations of how life should behave”). 
5 Introductions to such sources as diaries, life stories (zizhuan 自傳), self-criticisms, and social 
intelligence reports can be found in an archived version of Lund University’s Social History of 
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China, 1949–1979, a website created in 2013 that has been removed from Lund’s servers. 
Because the website is no longer live, the sources themselves are no longer available, but the 
archived essays remain quite useful 
(web.archive.org/web/20180515181803/http://projekt.ht.lu.se/rereso/sources). 
6 Examples include the Wilson Center Digital Archive (digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org), the 
Database for the History of Contemporary Chinese Political Movements 
(ccrd.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Default.aspx), and the Maoist Legacy database 
(www.maoistlegacy.de/db/users/login). More complete listings are available at 
www.prchistoryresources.org. 
7 PRC History Source Transparency, www.sfu.ca/prchistorytransparency.html. 
8 For details on how these organizations operate, see Xu and Hua 2013. 
9 The PRC History Group has archived back issues of these journals at prchistory.org/electronic-
journals-archive/. 
10 Pushing for diversity and inclusion is facilitated by such resources as NüVoices, which curates 
a directory of more than five hundred female experts on Hong Kong, Macau, mainland China, 
and Taiwan (nuvoices.com/experts-directory/). 
11 PRC history books whose contributions have been greatly enhanced by prioritizing Chinese 
names and voices at the chapter, page, paragraph, and sentence levels include Andreas 2009; 
Eyferth 2009; Hershatter 2011; Hou 2018; Leese 2011; J. Li 2014; Schmalzer 2008, 2016; Smith 
2013; and Wu 2014. 
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